Golan v. Gonzalez 501 F.3D 1179 (10TH CIR. 2007) by Arizmendi, Christian
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 18 
Issue 2 Spring 2008 Article 7 
Golan v. Gonzalez 501 F.3D 1179 (10TH CIR. 2007) 
Christian Arizmendi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Christian Arizmendi, Golan v. Gonzalez 501 F.3D 1179 (10TH CIR. 2007), 18 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. L. 441 (2008) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/7 
This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
GOLAN V. GONZALEZ
501 F.3D 1179 (10TH CIR. 2007)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Golan v. Gonzalez, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered claims challenging two congressional
acts: the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) and the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA).' Plaintiffs, a group of
conductors, educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, and
motion picture distributors2 , challenged both the CTEA and the
URAA on the grounds that these acts violated the Copyright Act
and Congress' limited power, and that they interfered with the
plaintiffs' First Amendment freedom of expression interests.3 The
district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the CTEA and granted
summary judgment to the government on the URAA claims. The
plaintiffs appealed.4 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit partly reversed
and partly affirmed the district court's decision.'
II. FACTS
A. The CTEA
In 1998, Congress passed the CTEA, also known as the Sonny
1. Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. The twelve plaintiffs included: Lionel Bently, John Blackburn, Lawrence
Golan, Ron Hall, Richard Kapp, Randy
Luck, Ray McAlister, John McDonough, Richard Prelinger, Mark Rose,
Kortney Stirland, and Hal Varian. Appellant's Opening Br. at 5 n.3, Golan v.
Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
3. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1182.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1197.
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Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.6 The CTEA added twenty
years of copyright protection to existing and future works, and
extended copyright protection to a term of seventy years after the
death of the copyright holder.7
Plaintiffs argued that the CTEA's "life-plus-seventy-years"
extension constituted a perpetuation of copyright protection, and
they challenged the CTEA on the basis that it violated the "limited
Times" provision of the Copyright Clause.8 In extending the
ultimate duration of copyright protection, the CTEA effectively
delayed when works would fall into the public domain and thus be
freely exploitable by the public. The plaintiffs relied on their
lawful ability to exploit works in the public domain for their
livelihood and argued that the CTEA prevented them from doing
so.
9
B. The URAA
In 1994, the United States entered into the URAA, the
concluding Final Act of the trade agreements in the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.1" Section 514 of the
6. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)).
7. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
8. Id. at 1183. The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
9. Golan, 501 F.3d 1182. For example, Plaintiff Golan is a University of
Denver, Lamont School of Music professor, conductor, and director of its
orchestral studies program. Appellant's Opening Br. at 13, Golan v. Gonzalez,
501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976. He teaches
and performs works by important classical and contemporary artists, such as
Dmitri Shostakovich and Igor Stravinsky, in order to give his students a full
education in orchestral studies and to cover the standard repertoire for music
auditions, performances, and competitions. Id. at 13-14. Golan had to wait
twenty additional years for certain works to fall into the public domain because
of the CTEA. Id. at 14.
10. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109 (2006)). The Uruguay Round
led to the most comprehensive trade agreements in history and involved over
123 countries. It sought "to create a fairer and more comprehensive, effective,
2
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URAA, dealing with restored works," amended § 104A of the
Copyright Act and implemented Article Eighteen of the Berne
Convention.12 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of §
514. First, they argued that § 514 exceeded Congress' inherent
power under the Copyright Clause because it shrank the public
domain by restoring works. 13 Second, plaintiffs challenged § 514
on the ground that it infringed their First Amendment freedom of
expression interests by limiting their access to certain foreign
works previously in the public domain. 14 The court acknowledged
that the URAA's copyright restoration provision forced the
plaintiffs to subsequently pay higher and prohibitive fees for
performances, sheet music rentals, and royalties for performing
and enforceable set of world trade rules and procedures." OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, A STATEMENT AS TO How THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS ACHIEVE CONGRESSIONAL NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES (Sept. 17,
1994), 1994 WL 761805. While the negotiations affected almost all world
trade, the relevant aspects to the Plaintiffs concerned the protection of
intellectual property rights. See World Trade Organization, The Uruguay
Round, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/fact5_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2008).
11. The term 'restored work' means an original work of authorship that-
(A) is protected under subsection (a);
(B) is not in the public domain in its source country through
expiration of term of protection;
(C) is in the public domain in the United States... ; and
(D) has at least one author or rightholder who was, at the time
the work was created, a national or domiciliary of an eligible
[WTO or Berne Union] country, and if published, was first
published in an eligible country and not published in the
United States during the 30-day period following publication
in such eligible country.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980.
12. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182. The Beme Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic works is an organization that provides for the protection of
literary and artistic works. Id. It requires member countries to provide the same
copyright protection to foreign authors as those countries provide for their own.
Id.; see also Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2853. Article Eighteen of the Berne Convention effectively
renews copyright in public domain works, because it requires member countries
to provide copyright protection to foreign works in their public domain whose
copyright is not yet expired in the origin country. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182 n.2.
13. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185.
14. Id. at 1185-86.
2008] 443
3
Arizmendi: Golan v. Gonzalez 501 F.3D 1179 (10TH CIR. 2007)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XVIII:441
foreign works that were once in the public domain.
III. ANALYSIS
The court began with a review of the basic principles of
copyright law, touching on its purposes and tensions. The court
considered whether the district court erred by dismissing the
plaintiffs' CTEA claim. Next, the court reviewed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to defendant and its dismissal
of plaintiffs' URAA claims.
A. Principles of Copyright Law
The Copyright Clause provides authors with initial monopolies
on their creative works and then, upon copyright expiration, makes
those works available through the public domain. 6 In this system
of rewards and benefits, copyright law fuels "the engine of free
expression" by encouraging authors to create works and then
allowing the public to utilize public domain works for their own
inspired creations. 7 The court found, however, that copyright
protection must be limited in duration. 18 Providing authors with
unending protection in their works would violate the 'limited
15. Id. at 1182. For instance, before the URAA, Plaintiff Golan and the
Lamont Symphony Orchestra could purchase the sheet music for, and perform
Shostakovich's "Symphony No. 1" an unlimited number of times, for a one-time
cost of approximately $130. Appellant's Opening Br. at 17, Golan v. Gonzalez,
501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976. After the
URAA, the cost increased to $495 to rent the same music for only a single
performance. Id. Similarly, Plaintiff Kapp, a renowned pianist and conductor,
claimed that he had relied on musical works in the public domain for over
thirty-five years for recording and performing. Id. at 13. The restoration of
works in the public domain resulted in higher licensing and sheet music rental
fees for those works, greatly limiting the pool of works that his orchestra could
consider for performances, given its budgetary constraints. Id. at 13-14. Also,
Plaintiffs Hall and McDonough, independent film distributors, respectively
claimed that 100 and 50 formally-public domain works that they owned can no
longer be distributed because of the URAA. Id. at 18-19.
16. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1183.
17. Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985)).
18. Id. at 1184.
444
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Times" provision of the Copyright Clause and effectively deprive
the public of a right to use the artistic expression. 19
The court recognized the inherent tension between the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment.2" Copyright law reserves
monopolies for authors on their artistic expressions, while the First
Amendment reserves freedom of expression for the public. The
court noted that, in order to prevent a total infringement on the
freedom of expression, the Copyright Clause has two built-in
safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense.2
The court made it clear, however, that even though the
Copyright Clause has. these built-in safeguards, copyright
legislation is not immune from First Amendment violations.22
When a Congressional act has altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, First Amendment review will be necessary.23
This led the court to emphasize an important principle of copyright
law: once a work has entered the public domain, no individual may
copyright it.24 Therefore, because a work in the public domain
belongs to the public, a legislative act that takes that work out of
the public domain is an alteration of the traditional contours of
copyright law.
B. The CTEA Claim
Plaintiffs contended that the CTEA violated the "limited Times"
provision of the Copyright Clause by perpetuating copyright
duration. In the lower decision, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claim, finding that it was precluded by the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft that the CTEA was
a rational exercise of Congress' legislative authority.25 Here,
plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their CTEA claim. They
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003)).
22. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.
23. Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1182 (citing Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D.
Colo. 2004)).
20081
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contended that it was wrongfully dismissed and not foreclosed by
the Eldred decision, because there, the plaintiffs had not
technically challenged the "life-plus-seventy years" provision of
the CTEA.26
The court, however, pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had
recently dismissed a similar challenge to the CTEA in the case of
Kahle v. Gonzales.27 There, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Eldred
decision, reasoning that it was the role of Congress, and not of the
judiciary, to define the scope of copyright duration. 8 The Ninth
Circuit said that a congressional determination will only be
subjected to rational review, and it upheld the CTEA. 29 The court
borrowed this reasoning and affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' CTEA claim because the Plaintiffs did not
convince the court to reach a decision contrary to the recent Kahle
case. 30
C. The URAA Claims
Plaintiffs alleged that § 514 of the URAA exceeded the authority
granted to Congress by the Copyright Clause and altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, thereby necessitating
First Amendment review.31 The district court granted summary
judgment to the government on both URAA claims.32 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the ruling that § 514 did not violate the Copyright
Clause, but it remanded the case to determine whether § 514
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection in a manner
that implicated plaintiffs' right to free expression under the First
Amendment.33
26. Id. at 1185.
27. Id. (citing Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007)).
28. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185.
29. Id. (citing Kahle, 487 F.3d at 701).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1185-86.
32. Id. at 1182.
33. Id. at 1197.
446
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1. Section 514 did not exceed Congress 'Authority
The plaintiffs alleged that § 514's copyright restoration of public
domain works exceeded Congress' constitutional authority.34
Plaintiffs compared their case to Graham v. John Deere Co.,
where the United States Supreme Court held that Congress could
not issue patents for inventions that were already in the public
domain at the time of the patent application.35 The Supreme Court
reasoned that such patent issuances would remove knowledge
from the public domain and restrict free access to materials already
available to the public. 6 Here, plaintiffs argued that the Graham
rationale was equally applicable to copyrights and that Congress
should be unable to copyright works in the public domain.37 The
court, however, refused to recognize the analogy and instead,
distinguished copyrights on the basis that they do not protect or
remove knowledge from the public like patents do.38 Furthermore,
the court noted that the Graham Court expressly omitted any
discussion of copyright law in its decision because such issues
were deemed irrelevant.39  Therefore, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the court should have extended the
Graham rationale to include copyright law.4"
The court concluded that Congress did not exceed its authority
by enacting § 514 of the URAA, and that Congress was fully
rational in choosing to comply with the requirements of the Berne
Convention. The court cautioned, however, that even though
Congress may have been acting within its Article I authority, § 514
may still be subject to First Amendment review.42
34. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1186.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1186-87 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003))
(emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1187.
40. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187.
41. Id.
42. Id.
2008]
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2. Section 514 Altered the Traditional Contours of Copyright
Protection by Removing Works From the Public Domain
The court next considered whether the removal of works from
the public domain altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, thereby implicating the plaintiffs' First Amendment
interests. If so, the court said, § 514 would be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny unless the Copyright Clause "safeguards"
were adequate to protect the plaintiffs' interests. The court
examined the traditional procedure for copyright protection, how
the public domain defined copyright protection, and Congress'
historical practice regarding the removal of works from the public
domain.43
a. Functional Prong Analysis
The court first examined the phrase, "traditional contours of
copyright protection," a term of art used, but not defined, by the
Supreme Court in Eldred." The court reasoned that this phrase
had both a functional and an historical basis for analysis, and it
took into consideration the Supreme Court's establishment in
Eldred that one of the bedrock principles of copyright law is that
works in the public domain must remain in the public domain.45
Because § 514 effectively recopyrighted works that were already
in the public domain, it violated a bedrock principle of copyright
law; thus, the court concluded that § 514 had, indeed, altered the
ordinary copyright procedure for copyright protection.46
43. Id. at 1187-88.
44. Id. at 1188-89.
45. Id. at 1189.
46. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189. Section 514 amended 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)
to read as follows:
(A) Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in
restored works, and vests automatically on the date of
restoration.
(B) Any work in which copyright is restored under this
section shall subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright
that the work would have otherwise been granted in the
United States if the work never entered the public domain in
the United States.
448
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Next, the court looked to the functional role that the public
domain played in defining the scope of copyright protection.47
The court made it clear that works in the public domain were not
copyrightable and ordinarily stayed in the public domain.48
Because § 514 allowed individuals to reclaim works in the public
domain and copyright them, it clearly conflicted with the principle
that no individual may copyright a work in the public domain.4 9
b. Historical Prong Analysis
Next, in order to determine whether or not there was a historical
precedent under which Congress would be justified in removing
works from the public domain, the court undertook an historical
analysis, focusing on the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
and on congressional history." The court determined that there
was insufficient evidence as to what the Framers could have
thought about the removal of works from the public domain.
Because there was such a scarcity of evidence or secondary
resources available on this issue, the court concluded that the
Framers must not have viewed the removal of works from the
public domain as being consistentwith the copyright scheme.52
The court then considered Congress' historical practice. The
government showed that there was a series of private bills that had
granted copyright in public domain works to individuals. 3 This
was not enough, however, to convince the court that a
Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,
4976 (1994).
47. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189-90.
48. Id. at 1189.
49. Id. at 1189-90.
50. Id. at 1190.
51. Id. at 1191. Although the first federal Copyright Act in 1790 granted
copyright protection to materials already printed in the U.S., it was not clear
whether this protection applied to works that may already have been in the
public domain. Id. The Government argued that it had applied to public
domain works at that time, but Plaintiffs provided evidence that most of the
works in question were not in the public domain because they were covered
only under state common-law copyright. Id.
52. Id.
53. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1191.
2008] 449
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congressional history or tradition existed of removing works from
the public domain. 4 The court reasoned that because these
individuals had to resort to petitions, an "uncommon tactic," it was
not strong evidence of a normal practice.55 Additionally, the
government tried to argue that its wartime Emergency Copyright
Act of 1941 showed a history of removing works from the public
domain.56 The court disagreed, seeing it as merely a "brief and
limited departure from a practice of guarding the public domain. 57
Therefore, because neither the private bills nor the exigencies of
war provided sufficient evidence to convince the court of a
congressional history of removing works from the public domain,
the court concluded that § 514 departed from the historical
tradition of keeping works in the public domain.58
The court concluded that neither its functional nor historical
analysis of the traditional contours of copyright protection
revealed a consistency with § 514's removal of works from the
public domain. Consequently, the court found that because § 514
changed the ordinary copyright sequence and removed works from
the public domain in direct contravention to tradition and history, §
514 altered the traditional contours of copyright protection. 9
3. Removal of Works from Public Domain Implicated First
Amendment Interests
Having determined that § 514 altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, the court turned to the relationship between
copyright law and the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests. 60 The
court explained that the public has an interest in using and
exploiting works in the public domain.6 The court acknowledged
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1191-92. The Emergency Copyright Act of 1941 waived copyright
formalities to foreign authors who were temporarily unable to comply with them
because of the disruption or suspension of facilities essential for such
compliance. Id. at 1192.
57. Id. at 1192.
58. Id.
59. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1193.
450
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that the plaintiffs' interests are particularly stronger here than in
other cases." Here, plaintiffs had already relied on their interests
in the public domain works when § 514 removed those works from
the public domain.63 The court found that § 514's recopyrighting
of public domain works undermined the purpose of the public
domain and "hamper[ed] free expression," thus, necessitating First
Amendment scrutiny.' 4
Although the Copyright Clause has "built-in First Amendment"
safeguards that protect the public's freedom of expression, the
court concluded that, in this case, the safeguards were insufficient
to protect the free expression interests at hand.65  The first
safeguard-the idea/expression dichotomy-distinguishes the
underlying, uncopyrightable elements, such as facts or ideas, from
their embodiment in a copyrightable expression.66 Because the
idea/expression dichotomy serves only as a utility to prevent the
monopolization of ideas, the court concluded that this safeguard
was useless in determining whether or not a congressional act had
violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests.67 The present
case did not deal with the monopolization of ideas, but with the
removal of works from the public domain.68 Consequently, the
idea/expression dichotomy did not protect the plaintiffs' free
expression interests.69
The second safeguard-the fair use defense-allows the public
to use copyrighted materials under certain circumstances, such as
for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research.7" Although this is an important safeguard that allows the
62. Id. In Eldred, for instance, there was no need for First Amdendment
review because: (1) the Copyright Clause safeguards adequately protected the
First Amendment interests; (2) plaintiffs only had a trivial interest, and never
"unfettered access" to, the works in question; and (3) the CTEA afforded
adequate supplemental protections. Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
221 (2003)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1194.
65. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1194.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1195 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
2008]
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public some latitude in using copyrighted materials, the court said
that the defense does not apply to interests in public domain
works.7' Technically, although the fair use defense would still
allow the public some access to restored works, the public's access
would still be confined to the above uses and thus, would be
narrower than if the works had remained in the public domain."
Therefore, the court found that neither of the built-in First
Amendment safeguards were sufficient under these facts to protect
the plaintiffs' interests.73 Additionally, the URAA, unlike the
CTEA, did not have supplemental First Amendment safeguards.74
The court ultimately remanded the case because it held that the
built-in safeguards were insufficient to protect the freedom of
expression interests in this case, and because the district court
failed to perform a First Amendment review of the plaintiffs'
interests.75 The court instructed that on remand, the district court
should determine whether § 514 is a content-based or content-
neutral restriction on the plaintiffs' freedom of expression
interests.76 Since content-based restrictions suppress speech based
on its content, the government must have a compelling and
narrowly-tailored reason for restricting the speech through § 514.
A content-neutral restriction must only be found to be narrowly-
tailored in serving a significant governmental interest. 77
IV. CONCLUSION
The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' CTEA
challenge on the ground that plaintiffs' claim was already
foreclosed by both the Eldred and Kahle cases.7 ' The Supreme
Court already had held that the CTEA was a constitutional
71. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1195.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1196. The URAA lacked similar exceptions and safeguards
protecting libraries, archives, institutions, small businesses, or restaurants that
the CTEA boasted. Id.
75. Id. at 1197.
76. Id. at 1196.
77. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
78. Id. at 1197.
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extension of copyright duration, and the Plaintiffs failed to provide
sufficient reasoning for the court to decide otherwise.7 ' The court
also affirmed the district court's decision that Congress did not
exceed its powers in enacting the URAA.8 The court, however,
remanded the case because the district court failed to perform First
Amendment scrutiny on the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests
that were triggered by § 514 of the URAA, which altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection by removing works
from the public domain.8'
Christian Arizmendi
79. Id. at 1185.
80. Id. at 1197.
81. Id.
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